Most demand management approaches with nonmandatory policies assume full users' cooperation, which may not be the case given users' beliefs, needs and preferences. In this paper we propose a mechanism for demand management including incentives both with and without money. The mechanism is validated by means of simulation, modeling the consumers as a finite multiagent system which evolves until a stable state, and social incentives diffusion using opinion dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
D Emand side management-DSM [20] , understood with is broader connotation enclosing Demand Response, energy efficiency and another ways of modifying electricity demand -is nowadays a widely discussed topic since optimization of infrastructure of the power system and electricity use arose as topic of interest trying to reduce climatic change and environmental impact of energy generation. In particular, the problem of demand response-DR-has been approached from various perspectives as the technical side, involving direct load control, the financial side, with differential tariffsday/night, hourly-, the informational side, with the inclusion of interactivity with the consumers through smart grids and from the game theory perspective, considering the problem as a Stackelberg game [3] , [13] , [27] where the service provider is a leader and the consumers are price takers, following leader's indication to maximize their profit.
Fotouhi Ghazvini et al. [8] present an incentive-based demand response programs approach for retail electricity providers with DG-distributed generation assets and energy storage systems, starting from the fact that for some countries, there are financial risks regarding the price variations due to contracts made when buying energy for a price that is then sold for a smaller value. They formulate a two-stage scenario-based stochastic problem which aims to establish the required financial incentive and the optimal dispatch of DG units and energy storage systems usage-for the day-ahead market-, thus minimizing the ERP risk of financial losses by reducing power peaks-when electricity prices are higher-. Even if their rationale is not fully applicable in a country where the domestic users are regulated, like in Colombia 1 , the concept of including stochastic decision parameters can be adapted and applied to the particular case, adressing the uncertainty about consumers' preferences by the incorporation 1 Where the electricity retailer has a guaranteed profit for the energy it sells. of stochastic decision parameters into their utility function. [8] mention the difficulty of knowing electricity consumers' behavior and translating qualitative valuations to numeric variables that can be computed when designing DR programs. This paper addresses the problem in part by modeling the consumers as a MAS system, and using opinion dynamics to model the social interaction and their evolution of users' preferences and beliefs, starting from an initial condition. [8] No tiene en cuenta el uso discreto del recurso, todo es como medio agregado.
[24], [23] Thimmapuram et al. [25] show an analysis of the effect of price elasticity on deregulated markets, where they make assumptions about the consumers characterization and their responsiveness to electricity price variations and use a multiagent system approach 2 to model the process of adaptation of the users. They state the inherent difficulty and complexity of measuring price elasticity, and estimations usually have high uncertainty. According to their recopilation of several elasticity studies, for residential costumers in the tradditional settingwithout smart meters-the price-load curve has a variable steep between -0.06 and -0.49 and in their simulation experiment, achieved load reduction by changing price was around 5%.
Regarding game theory and mechanism design approach, Nekouei et al. [17] have proposed a mechanism for demand management both at energy-market and small-consumers level. The former is treated as a Stackelberg game where generators are followers, and the latter is tackled with a VCG-like mechanism, ensuring consumers to reveal their true typepreferences-. The implementation is thought for application in South Australia, as for the power system structure and behavior. Haring et al. [10] propose an incentive compatible mechanism as solution for the power supply in imbalance conditions that require the use of ancillary services-AS-, treating the matter from the global perspective of the energy-market, without directly considering consumers' role but their aggregated demanded energy and power-flow in the transmission system. 3 The balancing energy parties-BRPmake the resource allocation based on their willingness to pay, modeled as a polynomial function depending on the energy demanded from AS during a period. They maximize Transmission System Operator's utility, as well as BRP assets.
Mhanna et al. [14] propose a distributed mechanism for day-ahead residential demand scheduling, making an effort to get a realistic implementation of the designed mechanism. They address four common assumptions: first, the treatment of household energy levels as continuous 4 , when they are actually a mix of continuous and discrete levels. Mhana et al.approximate the nonconvex problem by using mixed integer linear programming-MILP and an existing MILP solver. Second, the representation of a household's-user-valuation function by a concave increasing function 5 , which they assume rather constant and large for any device consumption profileschedule-that satisfies the user's preferences. In the present work, these assumption is adopted and modified, taking an evolving value for an user's valuation of her electricity consumption, modeled by means of opinion dynamics. Third, the payment schemes based on an energy allocation that will be fully accurate, while it might not be the case; and they propose a scoring rule-based payment which takes into account both day-ahead allocation and actual consumption, rewarding the accuracy of meeting the allocations. Finally, the implicit centralized implementation approach of mechanism design, where they take a distributed approach, in order to relax the computation requirements of a traditional centralized approach. With the previous assumptions, they get a mechanism that is asymptotically dominant incentive compatible, weakly budget balanced and fair in the charges to users-households-.
As electricity supply is in most places (if not all) a public service, and therefore must be granted to all inhabitants in a country, then enforcing policies for consumption change or mandatory taxes to higher consumptions are not really a practical option and there is no point in trying to reach an optimal use of the grid if consumers are not aware of it and willing to collaborate. Tackling this issue social networks models come to action, as consumers could be modeled as an information network of opinions reflecting users level of agreement to a certain measure or policy targeting DR. Furthermore, the measure subject to users will can be not only the acceptance of a directly monetary incentives program, but some policies with a goal of environmental or social impact, which requires users participation modifying their consumption according to a reference signal indicating if lower or higher consumption is required, which should be voluntarily followed appealing to moral conscience and empathy of people.
By modeling the information layer of the users as a graph, opinion dynamics approach can be used to study users beliefs evolution, constraining the demand response programs and incentives efficiency to a more realistic outcome considering that not all the society should actively participate in a certain DR program. A former approach of including social incentives for DR programs design and analysis is presented by Mojica-Nava et al. [16] , where users are assumed to follow a leader or prominent agent-which imposes the desired behavior-and deviate from their natural preferences proportionally to the leader influence exerted to each agent.
The fundament for including social incentives as modifiers for consumers behavior comes from its relationship with morality, tackled by several studies of altruist behavior in a society, giving some evidence that the actual behavior of people is not fully commanded by selfish principles, as stated by Adam Smith [9] , or as the evidence suggested by the recent study of Crockett et al. [4] about moral behavior when we have a choice of whether harm or not to the fellow.
II. SOCIETY(ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS) MODELED AS A GRAPH AND OPINION DYNAMICS

A. Graph Theory
Graph theory has the tools to model the interactions between a group of agents whom may have some kind of relationship, and has been extensively used to model different kind of systems and networks, like internet, the power system of a region or a country, the network of scientific papers citations, social networks interactions, and several others. As it would not be feasible to take the information of interactions and influences from existing users, the fact that many of the above mentioned real world networks can be modeled as a subtype random network known as small world is taken as base to model the interaction of users' opinion concerning the adoption or rejection of a DR oriented measure as a smallworld random graph. Small-world networks are characterized for having a short average path between nodes and high clustering coefficient than classic random networks [18] , while most nodes are connected to just a few neighbours, but also have a path to reach any other node in the network.
There are two well-known models for generating smallworld networks that have been compared and validated with empirical data: the Watts-Strogatz-WS-model, which reflects adequately the clustering seen in real networks, and the Barabási-Albert-BA-model, in which there is a starting seed network which is growth using the preferential attachment rule until the network desired size is reached. The BA model reflects better the degree distribution across the network, but does not represent clustering as good as WS model. As each model has advantages and weaknesses, in this paper both are used comparing results regarding the advantages in the DR problem modeling. In the figure 1 a network built with the Watts-Strogatz algorithm is shown. Figure 2 shows another possible network, this time built according to Barabási-Albert algorithm. Both networks have with average node degree m = 4 and N = 20 agents(nodes), and have reciprocal connections between neighbours, which can have different weight.
B. Opinion dynamics
If we represent a group of people which have some information exchange between them modeled as a graph, it can be used to derive some analytical formulation of the group's interaction, namely opinion dynamics, which aims to model the way interactions take place in a given group and how opinions people may have about certain topic evolve, conditioning in the end actual choices people make. One of the first models is the one by DeGroot in 1974 [5] , with his approach to reach a consensus of opinions between a group of persons considering the weighted adjacency matrix as an influence network. Friedkin and Johnsen in 1990 [6] , studied the topic as social influence network theory. Years later they came to propose a model [7] of the interactions of a group of n persons, taking into consideration the susceptibility to change of each individual, as well as the influence of every neighbor's opinion in an weighted average profit function that ultimately led to consensus. Their model is still the core for more recent social networks modeling, and unlike most models, has been validated in small and medium population groups for several problems [19] . Hegselmann and Krause [11] proposed a modified model taking into account a confidence factor, which limited the group of neighbors whose opinion Figure 3 . Opinion dynamics for a society of 20 agents, described by eq. 1.
influenced one person's particular beliefs, to those within a similarity range called bounded confidence, mantaining the averaged opinion calculation with the neighbors within the bounded confidence subset. More recently, Mirtabatabaei et al. [15] have proposed a modification of the Friedkin-Johnsen's model, including coefficients to characterize various parameters of the social interaction of a group of individuals discussing a sequence of issues s, as shown in eq.1,
where, for the individual i, the term y i (t) is the opinion at time t, θ i the susceptibility to change her initial opinion, x i (s) the self-confidence of person about a particular issue, and c ij the credibility given to neighbors' opinion, as an interpersonal weight matrix C, that is row stochastic with zero diagonal [7] . [15] assumes some simplifications for Friedkin-Johnsen's model, regarding the coupling between prejudices and initial conditions.
In figure 3 is showed the evolution of the population described by the graph in fig. 1 , and society coefficients varying as shown in fig. 4 . As the stubbornness of individuals is increasing as is their initial belief about the issue, with their self-confidence higher for those with extreme positions, the opinion's stable state tends to reach an agreement about the issue, allowing for a democratic range in individual stances. Turning to the matter in hand, if the issue discussed by the society is regarding to the acceptance or disagreement to a certain measure targeting DR, then fig. 3 represents how individuals reach a final opinion about their collaboration in the DR program, being 0 none collaboration, and 1 full agreement to the requests.
III. MAS MODEL OF THE CONSUMERS: POPULATION DYNAMICS AND REVISION PROTOCOLS
Taking a perspective from distributed control, electricity demand side can be modeled by means of evolutionary game theory [2] , [16] , [26] , where a group of individuals change their state over time trying to maximize their profit.
The detailed evolution of a population of agents, i.e how and when they update their strategies as time passes, is called a revision protocol. The set of a revision protocol, which models the population dynamic, and a population game, which models the strategic environment for the players, define a stochastic evolutionary process [22] , [26] , that, according to the law of large numbers 6 [21] , if the number of agents is very large it can derive a deterministic process called mean dynamic.
A revision protocol ρ p is a map ρ p : R n p × X p → R n p ×n p + . The scalar ρ p ij (π p , x p ) is called conditional switch rate, from strategy i ∈ S p to strategy j ∈ S p , given payoff vector π p and population state x p . When using a revision protocol, it is assumed that each agent has a Poisson alarm clock with independent ring time, at rate R. Each alarm ring, the agent has an opportunity for strategy revision, switching to j = i with probability ρ p ij /R and keeping strategy i with probability 1 − j =i ρ p ij /R. When an agent changes her strategy, population's state changes accordingly having into account agent's decision.
One of the most studied and used is the replicator dynamics, which is an imitation dynamic that conditions the change of strategy of a user to a repeated comparison with the profit of other population's individuals; if the individual i's payoff is lower than that of individual j's, she may update her strategy to the strategy played by j and continue the interactions. According to Sandholm [21] pure replicator dynamics violate Nash stationarity, which is required for the dynamics to converge in a finite time, and it is necessary to include at least an small proportion of a mixed dynamic with direct strategy selection, to ensure that there are no permanently extinct strategies. The pairwise comparison revision protocol is an example of direct strategy selection, and was first proposed by Smith, who derived from it the Smith dynamics. Candidate strategy j is chosen randomly from S.
Pairwise comparison revision protocol is selected to model 6 Which states that given a large number of agents the noise due to extreme preferences is eliminated in the average behavior. the strategy revision and update process that generates the dynamic in the game, as users will know available strategies set and can make a direct choice, rather than copying the behavior of other consumers. However, in the implementation phase it is made a modification to the protocol, regarding the random selection of candidate strategies. In order to accelerate convergence of the dynamic, the selection is restricted to a strategy that enhances current payoff, similar to the best response dynamics [22] .
In a natural non-incentived state, the MAS model of the society receives as input load profiles from the users reflecting their valuation of electricity use for each interval during the period, which may be grouped under a few profiles -if it was desired to model groups with similar preferences-or individual independent profiles for each consumer, and starting from an uniform initial energy distribution, after the population dynamics evolution the model outputs another load profile, similar to the one used as input. With this setting, the natural state of the population can be altered through incentives.
IV. MECHANISM DESIGN AND INCENTIVES INTEGRATION
The demand response problem is initially adressed in the way of Barreto et al.propose in [2] , taking their mechanism as starting point. The mechanism is an indirect revelation mechanism, based in VCG 7 [26] , incentive compatible and achieving pareto optimality if incentives are used during the transition period.
A. Game Setting
Let a population P be formed by a group of usershouseholds-. Each user i has a set of N electricity powered devices, and some usage preferences θ i ∈ Θ for a number of consumption periods T , that can be-or not-different for each user and each period. Preferences Θ are related to a set of strategies S = 1, 2, ...Σ for each consumption period, associated to the proportion of the period the user prefers to use a device, i.e. consume an specified amount of energy. Each user tries to maximize her utility, and the interaction within the whole society can be stated as a population game, where the fitness function for each user is her utility function, with dynamics based in the pairwise comparison protocol that leads to Smith dynamics.
Utility function for each user can be described as :
Where ϑ n i : Signals if the i th user consumption is according to her preference for device n, for a given period. Q t = i∈P q i and q i is the energy consumption of user i for a period.
The maximization problem solved for each period using and evolutionary approach can be stated as in eq. 6.
As it is shown in eq. 3, the users' profit depends of their accuracy following their own consumption preferences, and profit amount depends on the subjective valuation given by each user to the usage given to the set of devices they may own, and provide diverse functionality like TVs, AC units, PC and so on. As users' preferences are private information, and even a given user may not be fully aware and conscious of her own, it is not feasible to know their true value and include it to the model as part of an utility function that reflects actual consumer behavior. It can be known, however, that in a population there will always be a wide range for these preferences where the minimum will be slightly higher than the consumed electricity price and the maximum will be many times the price paid for the electricity. Valuation vector is a real valued α ∈ [p < α min , α max ].
In order to get an approximation to user preferences, it is assumed that preferences are embedded in aggregated load profile for an user, and they can be extracted from it via virtual demand disaggregation.
Assumption 1: In natural state, consumption preferences for a given user form by aggregation her load profile.
Assumption 2: Subjective users' valuation of energy consumption has an wide range, and can be contained in a closed numeric interval, producing an equivalent effect to the realworld difuse valuation usually made by a person. Assumption 2, makes posible to propose an opinion dynamics for the evolution in time of the consumers' subjective valuation of energy, stating an starting condition (initial valuation), susceptibility and confidence-self and mutual-parameters required by Friedkin-Johnsen's model to compute final users' valuation state.
The population game runs in parallel for each time period, until the population state-load profile-reaches stable state.
Theorem 1: For a population of users with final resource valuation given by an opinion dynamics exists an equilibrium state reached in finite computation time. Limits range can also be known.
B. Monetary Incentives
For applying the financial incentives, they should be constrained, as usually we don't want to reduce consumption for all periods, but for some of them with power peaks. Now, if we want to modify users' energy consumption, incentives must give users a higher total utility, so they will be willing to change their strategies shifting away from natural preferences. Punishment(negative) incentives are not considered as forced changes are not desired unless there is a risk of outage or blackout.
Monetary incentives can be fixed as:
where γ is the surplus for consuming away from preference and q redux the reduced energy consumption. This could be slightly larger than one, and its exact value when the mechanism is implemented should be derived empirically for each population.
In the case studio a period qualifies for incentives if the whole consumption for the period is above the weekly average.
C. Social (Non-monetary) Incentives
It is likely that monetary incentives are not always worthy for domestic users considering their inherent low elasticity (Only those with very low valuation would be sensitive to changes in price). The other possibility to change energy use 8 is by changing user's preferences directly, so they would have maximum utility by realizing the new preferences. If the initial belief(agreement) to a certain DR program, nonmonetary motivated, are known, we can model its evolution using opinion dynamics, interpreting the result as a probability of engage to the program and shift preferences accordingly.
Social incentives are introduced in the system via opinion dynamics, associating i th user opinion to her probability to agree with the proposed demand response reference profile. This probability is also related to the subjective user valuation given to the alternate benefit associated with the DR program. Eqs. 9 to 13 show the proposed incentive, where if the user decides to engage the DR program will adapt her preference until she reaches her flexibility limit, .
Where rf : shift impulse factor and σ dr : probability to engage with DR program.
In order to implement the mechanism in the MAS model for the demand, utility of the individuals can be seen as the potential function in a potential game [12] , as it condenses all the information about payoffs required for agents' incentives in a single scalar-valued function [22] .
Theorem 2: Let bla bla (describe the game setting, ) then G is a potential game, with potential function, so the population dynamics approach is valid and there is a Nash equilibrium as dynamic is also NS and PC. adsdasdsa.
D. Mechanism Properties
Understanding the mechanism as the allocation rule and the resulting social choice, the proposed mechanism has the following properties:
• Incentive compatibility (strategy proofness). • Indirect revelation, as preferences remain private and only aggregate consumption is spread. • Contrary to traditional approach, social choice does not need to choose from society individual preferences, but states the energy consumption associated to them.
V. MECHANISM IMPLEMENTATION, RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Users' profile generation
The only available information regarding users' consumption in Colombia is the aggregated monthly consumption per user sorted by strata, and the consumption distribution across all strata. In order to input the information required by the model, an algorithm for generating users' profiles from the aggregate consumption is needed. This algorithm should randomly generate a plausible profile, taking into account assumptions about users' electric devices and their consumption, usage patterns and aggregated monthly consumption so that the profile meets the monthly consumption for a real-world user.
B. Convergence
Convergence and stability of the proposed model depends on convergence of the forming dynamics, i.e.for opinion and population. Population dynamics using pairwise comparison revision protocol satisfy both Nash Stationarity-N.S. and Positive Correlation-P.C., which are conditions that ensure long term stability for the dynamic. Creo que esta parte no es suficiente, porque aplica solo para dinámicas con población muy grande, cuando hay una ec diferencial.
Exponential protocol, because are reversible markov process and then has infinite-horizon behavior (time stability)
C. Population game
PDToolbox [1] was used as starting point, making modifications in order to enable multipopulation settings with revision protocols and the required additions to appropriately including the utility function, fitness and opinion dynamics into the model. Modified code is available via GitHub at https://github.com/macortesgu/PDToolbox_matlab.
Running the game for a week with hourly periods with P = 20 agents, population masses -energy weekly consumption-of 29.84 kWh and 27.66 kWh for each half of users, and informational side conditions as in figures 1 , 2 and 4, got the resulting power allocation for the society(aggregated consumers) of figure 5 , for the Watts-Strogatz graph case, and 6 for the Barabási-Albert model. As can be seen, for the given case the resulting power allocation reduction is similar, specially lowering consumption peaks while encouraging consumption during less-activity hours. Observing the parameters of the society used for the opinion dynamics, the result is somewhat expected, as the few stubborn agents are willing to collaborate with the DR program, convincing the rest of the population toward agreement during the social interaction. This will not always be the case, and if we consider the case shown in figures 7 and 8 as an example, where stubborn agents are less willing to collaborate, the load shifting is smaller. We can aknowledge that the former case is in a certain way a maximum potential of demand management when a feasible best case of most individuals collaborating occur. TODO**comparison of type of random network effect (links, directionality) in the results of allocated power**
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Scenario-based predictions can be done by setting the opinion dynamics parameters with some desired values, and watching the effect this opinion has in the electricity consumption of users during a period, e.g. a week.
An indirect revelation, incentive compatible mechanism for electricity demand management has been proposed. The mechanism maximizes domestic users' utility, achieved when their consumption matches their private preferences. Monetary and non-monetary incentives are also proposed for changing total consumed energy, whether it be an increase or a decrease for certain consumption periods. In order to validate the mechanism, it has been proposed a MAS model of the users, that reproduce a given consumption profile in its natural state, before applying the desired incentives, helping to shift loads and lower peaks, within the technical restrictions of the users. The proposed MAS, based in a finite-agents number population game, uses discrete energy levels according to home appliances and devices characteristics and a fitness function that accounts for users subjective valuation of electricity, given the specific device that uses the energy, obtaining a more realistic approach to the problem.
